The Substantive Standard of the IDEA

During 2017 the U.S. Supreme Court has again refreshed our understanding concerning the rights of special needs students, having held that an appropriate education for a student with a disability is one that is “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances. [1]

With this decision, we have some new and interesting language. For example,  a board of education must be able to “. . . offer a cogent and responsive explanation for their decisions . . .” Endrew F., Supra. Of course, this has always been the case, but the new twist is interesting. Contrast this with the codification of a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) found in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401–82 (2017) at § 1412(a)(1)), which says:

“A free appropriate public education is available to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive, including children with disabilities who have been suspended or expelled from school.”

It is unambiguous, but flat and it lacks the context to help us understand the substantive standard that a parent can expect. The Supreme Court’s first explicit statement of the substantive FAPE standard arrived in the opinion of Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982); “educational benefit.”

Over the years, various courts have expanded our understanding of FAPE:

“The purpose of IDEA is to provide students with a “basic floor of opportunity” of access to specialized instruction and related services that are individually designed to provide educational benefits.” [2] 

Neither the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) nor Article 89 of the New York State Education Law requires a school district to provide special education and related services designed to maximize the potential of a disabled student. Nor do federal and state education laws require a school district to provide the best possible educational program and related services or match those services requested by a parent. [3] Rather, the goals and mandates of the IDEA and N.Y. Education Law are relatively modest: namely, to provide appropriate specialized education and related services sufficient for the disabled student to benefit from his/her education. [5]

This straightforward obligation of the District is underscored by the obligation to demonstrate the appropriateness of the program recommended by its CSE. To meet its burden, a board of education must show that its recommended program is reasonably calculated to confer educational benefits. [4] The recommended program must also be provided in the least restrictive environment. [6]

So, if your anything like me, this is just a springboard to begin your research into the ever changing practice of Special Education Law. Thanks for your interest.

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[1] See Endrew F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. RE-1. 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).

[2] See, Board of Education, Hendrick Hudson CSD v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189-190, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982); Walczak v. Florida UFSD, 142 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 1998).

[3] See Application of a Child With a Disability (City School District of Buffalo), S.R.O. Decision 04-20 (2004).

[4] See,  Straube v. Florida UFSD, 801 F. Supp. 1164, 1175-1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Moubry v. Independent School District, 9 F. Supp.2d 1086, 1104 (D. Minn. 1998) (citing Rowley).

[5] See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).

[6] See 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b); 8 NYCRR 200.6(a)(1).